This study investigates 40 Japanese REIT IPOs during 2001 to 2006 and finds evidence that higher final offer prices are reflected in higher underpricing levels by such IPOs. There is also some evidence that suggests the engagement of one of the big 3 Japanese underwriting firms suggests less money is left on the table. Economies of scale in underwriting fees for Japanese REIT IPOs are also found.
Introduction
Much of the literature into initial public offerings (IPOs) has focused on the anomaly of investors being able to make substantial returns, on average, by subscribing to new share issues and hypothetically selling at the closing price on the first day of listing. This anomaly has been termed "underpricing", since the literature has consistently, over the past forty years established that on average, the issue or offer price by the issuing company is below the first day's trading price. The vast majority of this literature has however concentrated on industrial company IPOs (see for example Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) and Ritter (2003) ). The literature on the underpricing of real estate investment trust (REIT) IPOs has not been nearly so clearly consistent.
The range of first day returns for United States REIT IPOs has been from a significant 2.82% overpricing (Wang et al., 1992) during the period 1971 to 1988 (although Below et al., 1995 argue that 4 The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we briefly summarise some previous property IPO research. Section 3 identifies the data and methodology. In section 4 we report the results of our analysis. Section 5 contains our conclusions.
Previous Property IPO Cost of Equity Raising Research
There are two major areas of investigation into the costs of equity capital raising by property IPOs.
The first is in the underpricing of property IPOs (which is an indirect cost to the issuer) and a more recent body of enquiry has occurred into the direct costs of capital raising.
In the area of the underpricing of property IPOs, research has been done into the two major types of property IPOs. The first type is the trust structure type, identified by REIT IPOs in the U.S. and by LPT IPOs in Australia. In brief, these are where a trust entity owns and earns income from property assets but must pass on 95% (or more) of the earnings to the beneficiaries (unit holders) of the trust.
As a result, the trust itself is not assessed for tax on the income but the beneficiaries are. The second type of property IPO research relates to property companies that own property and hence may earn rental income from property investments or may actually trade in property. These entities pay tax at the ordinary company tax rate and have no obligation to pay any dividends at all. Property companies are common in the U.K. and in many other parts of Europe such as France and Sweden. The following discussion relates to these two property IPO types.
The Underpricing of REIT and LPT IPOs
One of the first major papers in the area of REIT IPO pricing was Wang et al. (1992) . This study of 87 U.S. REIT IPOs during the period 1971 to 1988 identified a significant 2.82% overpricing to subscribers. While offering three plausible explanations for the relatively large differences in underpricing between industrial company and REIT IPOs, even Wang et al. (1992) conceded it was difficult to understand why subscribers subscribed to the new issues given the on average overpricing of REIT IPOs and suggested it could have been ignorance on the part of these investors. They did however provide three explanations for the large differences in underpricing. Firstly, they suggested that more uninformed investors subscribed to REIT IPOs; secondly, that REIT IPOs prior to 1989 had a restricted ability to grow because they were required to liquidate their holdings at some future point in time; thirdly that the underlying real estate assets gave a clear basis of support for the REIT IPO valuation.
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) followed Wang et al. (1992) by investigating the underpricing of 85 U.S.
REIT IPOs during the 1991 to 1994 period. Contrary to Wang et al. (1992) , Ling and Ryngaert (1997) report a significant 3.60% average first day underpricing return to subscribers. Ling and Ryngaert (1997) point out that institutional investors had substantial stake holdings in the 1991 to 1994 REIT IPO data set and that post 1990 REIT IPOs were not obliged to liquidate asset holdings at some time in the future. Dimovski and Brooks (2006a) investigate a sample of 37 Australian property trust IPOs during 1994 to 1999. An expanded study by Dimovski and Brooks (2006b) of 58 property trust IPOs followed for the period 1994 to 2004. Such IPOs in the earlier period included both trustees (who had a fiduciary responsibility to protect the assets and income for and on behalf of the beneficiaries) and managers (who were responsible for managing the assets professionally), property trust IPOs for the period after 2000 need only appoint a single "responsible entity". Dimovski and Brooks (2006b) suggest that the removal of the trustee safeguard may have resulted in greater uncertainty about the IPO and hence a higher underpricing of those property trust IPOs that listed since 2000. Both papers confirm that higher dividend forecasting property trust IPOs appear to signal higher uncertainty about the future cash flows of the trust and hence have higher underpricing. Glascock et al. (2004) confirm however that REITs are generally viewed as lower risk investments. As such, their underpricing is likely to be lower than industrial company IPOs. Sahi and Lee (2001) investigated a sample of 48 U.K. property IPO companies during 1986 to 1995.
The Underpricing of Property Company IPOs
While 26 of these were property investment companies showed a 4.11% average first day return, it was not statistically significantly different from zero. The other 22 were property trading companies that showed a 12.14% statistically significant first day return. Sahi and Lee (2001) Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) report a smaller but still statistically significant market adjusted 2.55% underpricing return. Chen and Lu (2006) investigated 197 U.S. REIT IPOs over the period 1980 to 1999, which raised slightly over US$31 billion. They report a bimodal clustering of gross spreads at 6.5% and 7% and that spreads for REIT IPOs had decreased significantly in the 1990s. Chen and Lu (2006) 
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Data and Methodology
The sample includes all J-REIT IPOs listed on the TSE from September 10, 2001 to December 31, 2006. Individual company prospectuses were used for a majority of the data. Some of the data has also been checked with Nomura Securities. The data sought includes variables from the previous LPT and REIT IPO studies that have been found to be statistically significant in explaining the level of underpricing and money left. The closing price at the end of the first day's trading was obtained from Nomura Securities. This closing price was deducted from the final offer price and the result divided by the final offer price to calculate the underpricing return to the subscribers of the REIT IPO. While underpricing refers to the percentage return made by subscribers, money left is the aggregate amount of underpricing times the number of shares issued. It is, as the name suggests the amount of money left by the company to subscribers. The following elements of data were extracted from each of the prospectuses of the 40 J-REIT IPOs:
• OFFERPRICE -is the offer or issue price per unit paid by the IPO subscribers [Chalk and Peavy (1987) , Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) , Bradley et al (2006) ];
• BIG3UNDERWRITER -is a binary variable of 1 if the underwriter is one of the big 3 underwriting firms of Nomura, Nikko or Diawa and 0 if otherwise [Kutsuna, Smith and Smith (2007) ];
• FOREIGNUNDERWRITER -is a binary variable of 1 if a foreign underwriter was involved in the underwriting and 0 if otherwise [Kutsuna, Smith and Smith (2007) ];
• LNCAPRAISED -is the total equity capital sought [Michaelly and Shaw (1994) , Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) ];
• MKTSENTI -is a variable derived by calculating the discrete return on the TSE index (TOPIX) between the final offer price and closing price on the day of listing [Dimovski and Brooks (2004) The mean underpricing return to subscribers for the 40 sample set of REIT IPOs was around one half of one percent and for the more recent 34 sample set it was around three quarters of one percent.
Neither of these returns is statistically significantly different to zero. Returns ranged from negative 11% to positive 22%. The mean money left by the issuers was around 640 million yen (approximately US$5.5 million) and 750 million yen (approximately US$6.4 million) for the 40 sample set and 34 sample set respectively. These money left aggregates are also not statistically significantly different to zero. Given Beatty and Ritter's (1986) The average J-REITs gross proceeds raised were around 45 billion yen (approximately US$385 million). The smallest equity capital raising was around 3.5 billion yen (approximately US$38 million) and the biggest was nearly 17.8 billion yen (approximately US$1.5 billion). Underwriting fees ranged from 3.5% to 5% with an average of around 3.75% of the capital raised. This is lower than the average 5.66% underwriting fee charged on bookbuilding to Japanese industrial company IPOs as reported in Kutsuna and Smith (2004) . The forecast dividend yield for the next full financial year ranged from 2.8% to 6.6% with the mean average of around 4.5% (while Japanese prime lending rates 
where all the variables are as defined previously, the β's are unknown parameters to be estimated and
.
The OFFERPRICE and LNCAPRAISED variables have been included in many industrial company IPO studies as well as the REIT IPO studies previously mentioned. It is expected that higher offer prices and larger capital raisings suggest greater certainty about the IPO and hence lower underpricing would be expected from such IPOs.
The BIG3UWRITER and FOREIGNUWRITER variables are often discussed in the literature surrounding the institutional setting of Japanese IPOs (see for example Kutsuna, Smith and Smith, 2007) . Both of these types of underwriters would carry substantial reputation capital and using Carter and Manaster (1990) and Michaelly and Shaw (1994) it would be expected that REIT IPOs employing either of these types of underwriters would be less underpriced.
The MKTSENTI or REITSENTI variables reflect the change in the TOPIX index or J-REIT index from the date of the offer price is finalized to the date of listing. It is expected that the more positive (negative) the mood of the market in this short intervening period the higher (lower) the underpricing.
An investment banker's compensation for underwriting the IPO is reflected in the underwriting fee, or spread. As Chen and Lu (2006) note that underwriting fees may well be associated with the uncertainty of a successful issue and Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that underpricing is associated with uncertainty about the issue, it would not be unreasonable to expect an association between underwriting fee and underpricing. As such, this variable is included to test the hypothesis that uncertainty about the J-REIT IPO may be reflected in the underwriter fee itself. The FORCDIVYLD variable reflects the next full year's forecasted distribution from the trust. Dimovski and Brooks (2006a) argue that such a measure may be considered as a proxy for risk amongst REIT IPOs in that J-REIT IPOs offering higher forecast dividend yields may offer higher underpricing returns to subscribers.
The underwriting fees (or spread) are generally the largest single expense for most REIT IPOs. The second purpose of this study was to investigate possible factors influencing these underwriting fees.
As such, an ordinary least squares regression model with UWRITINGFEE (as a percentage) as the dependent variable was developed and is expressed as:
where LNCAPRAISEDSQ is calculated by squaring the LNCAPRAISED, OVERALLOT is a binary variable identifying whether an overallotment option was given to the underwriters, and all the other variables are as defined previously, the β's are unknown parameters to be estimated and ε is assumed
The BIG3UWRITER and FOREIGNUWRITER variables examine whether employing such underwriters influences the underwriting spread. Chen and Lu (2006) examined underwriter spreads relating to REIT IPOs specifically. They suggest that lower ranked underwriters charged higher gross spreads than higher ranked underwriters. Our model investigates whether such a relation may occur in the J-REIT IPO context. Given that the big 3 underwriters and the foreign underwriters are all highly prestigious investment banks, it is expected such firms may be associated with lower underwriting fees.
As in Chen and Lu (2006) it is expected that there is a strong association between the size of the capital raising and the underwriting fee. Our model employs the LNCAPRAISED and LNCAPRAISEDSQ variables to examine that even though larger capital raising IPOs should benefit with lower spreads, whether this benefit decreases at a diminishing rate. The OVERALLOT variable is included in the model because the overallotment option may be of financial benefit to the underwriters since they have the option to buy additional shares from the issuer at the offering price.
The FORCDIVYLD variable is included since J-REIT IPO forecasted dividend yields appear quite attractive and hence may be useful to underwriters in marketing the issue. As such, this variable may influence underwriting fees.
Results
The regression results related to the factors influencing the underpricing and money left characteristics of J-REIT IPOs are presented in Tables 2 and 3 . Table 4 reports the regression results relating to factors influencing the underwriting fees of J-REIT IPOs. A range of diagnostic tests were used in analyzing the data. A Jarque-Bera test for normality, a White test for heteroskedasticity and a Ramsey
Reset test for omitted variables were applied on the data and the results reported. Table 2 reports the regression results for factors influencing underpricing while Panel B of Table 2 Chalk and Peavy (1987) , Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) and Bradley et al (2006) , but these IPOs are anything but penny stock IPOs. Recall the average offer price of these J-REIT IPOs was 550,000 yen (around US$4700) with the lowest one offering at 200,000 yen (around US$1700) and the highest at 880,000 yen (around US$7500). These findings suggest there is more uncertainty about higher priced J-REIT IPO issues than lower priced ones, perhaps because the investment per unit is so substantial that subscribers may be concerned about the liquidity and marketability (possible greater bid-ask spreads and thinner market) of higher priced issues. The BIG3UWRITER variable is also significant in the money left model. It appears that employing the largest three investment banking firms to underwrite J-REIT IPOs tended to allow issuers to leave less money on the table for subscribers.
(insert table 2 about here)
To further test the robustness of the models, Table 3 This study however uncovers that the final offer price of J-REIT IPOs is a significant factor influencing the first day return to subscribers and in determining the amount of money left by the issuing firm itself. While J-REIT IPO offer prices are substantial indeed, it appears that higher offer prices tend to allow higher underpricing returns and more money left. There is also some evidence to suggest that the engagement of one of the big 3 Japanese investment banks to underwrite a J-REIT IPO issue may allow the issuing firm to leave less money on the table for subscribers. Finally while Chen and Lu (2006) find some evidence of clustering in underwriting fees, this study identifies economies of scale in underwriting fees relative to larger IPO equity capital raisings.
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